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G. England*
E. Gardner**

Compensation for Pension
Benefit Losses in Unlawful
Dismissal

I. Introduction
This paper describes, firstly, how the "real-world" pension benefit
losses of an unlawfully dismissed employee are dictated by three
main variables: the benefit structure of the plan; the legal structure
of the plan; and the employee's position in the labour market.
Secondly, it shows that the common law measure of damages in a
wrongful dismissal action fails to compensate adequately those
losses. In contrast, the measures of damages in collective agreement
arbitration, and in adjudication pursuant to section 61.5 of the
Canada Labour Code' create the potential for a more realistic
approach to compensating the employee for his "real-world"
losses. Thirdly, comparison is made with the more fully developed
jurisprudence under the British unfair dismissal legislation.
Fourthly, some guidelines for compensating the "real-world"
pension losses of the employee are suggested for Canadian legal
umpires.
II. The Problem: Variables Affecting "Real-World" Pension
Benefit Losses
The vast majority of pension plans take one of two forms. 2 First, the
employer may contract with a life insurance company for the
*The law herein is stated as of December 31, 1982.
*Associate Professor of Labour Relations, University of Lethbridge
**Associate Professor of Finance, University of Lethbridge
1. CanadaLabour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1 as am. Similar schemes exist in An
Act Respecting Labour Standards, S.Q. 1979, c.45 as am. ss. 124-132 and the
Labour Standards Code, S.N.S. 1972, c. 10 as am. s. 67A. It can reasonably be
expected that other provinces will eventually follow suit.
2. Excellent descriptions of the mechanics of private pension plans, which were
relied on heavily by the authors, are found in C.C.H. Canadian, "Employment
Benefits and Pension Guide, Vol. 1," (hereinafter referred to as the C.C.H.
Guide); P. Kumar and A.M.M. Smith, "Pension Reform in Canada: A Review of
the Issues and Options" (Queens University Industrial Relations Centre, 1981)
especially pp. 1-10; J. Fichaud, "Pensions: A Primer for Lawyers" (1975), 2 Dal.
L.J. 369; H. N. Janisch (ed.), "Collective Bargaining in the Context of Inflation,"
Proceedings of a Conference held at the Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University,
May 3, 1975, (Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, 1975), especially pp. 34-75.
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purchase of an annuity in favour of his employees at retirement. The
insurance company, which will often administer the rules of the
plan alone or in conjunction with the employer, holds the benefit of
the contract in trust for the employees. Second, the employer may
execute a trust indenture for the benefit of the employees, in which
custody and legal title to the fund vest in the trustee, often a trust
company. In both cases, the employee beneficiary may have a cause
of action against the fund for breach of trust. This paper, however,
is concerned with the employee's rights against his employer when,
as a result of his unlawful termination, 3 he must withdraw from a
fund in which he has been and would have remained a member had
he not lost his job. His losses, therefore, must take account of both
the benefit position which he has accrued up to the date of dismissal
and the future benefit position which he would have achieved had he
not been unlawfully dismissed.
A. The Benefit Structure of the Plan
The starting point in assessing the employee's losses is to
determine, according to the benefit structure of the plan, the amount
of his accrued benefits at the date of dismissal and the amount by
which such benefits would have increased had he not been
dismissed. Although there is a ". . .diversity of arrangements and a
complexity of patterns which defy easy description", 4 it is possible
to distinguish the following broad categories of pension plan.
1. "Defined Contribution" Plan
This entails the regular payment of defined contributions by the
employee and/or the employer to the account of the employee. The
capital sum provided is invested for the benefit of the fund. The
total sum is used to purchase the employee an annuity at retirement,
the value of which depends on how much is accounted to him at that
time. There are two kinds of "defined contribution" plans: a
"money purchase" plan, and a "profit sharing" plan. The former
3. In the context of this paper, this is deemed to include common law wrongful
dismissal, discharge without "just cause" in collective agreement arbitration and
"unjust" discharge under section 61.5 of the Canada Labour Code.
4. Pradeep and Smith, at p. 5, supra, note 2. According to Pradeep and Smith, in
1978 there were 15,095 private pension plans covering 4.2 million workers, or
39% of the labour force (at pp. 11-12). Detailed statistics as to the incidence in
1978 of the various kinds of pension plans described herein can be found in the
C.C.H. Guide, Vol. 1, at p. 2125, supra, note 2.
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specifies the amount of contribution required from the employee
and/or the employer, normally a fixed percentage of the employee's
annual earnings. The latter relates the employer's contributions to
the profitability of the company according to a defined formula, and
does not generally require joint contribution from the employee.
2. "Defined Benefit" Plan
This specifies the amount of pension benefit payable to the
employee according to a formula based on given years of service
and given income levels. There are two kinds of "defined benefit"
plans: a "flat benefit" plan, and a "unit benefit" plan. The former
simply specifies a dollar amount for each year of service. The latter
bases the amount of benefit on various formulae, the most common
of which are: "final" earnings; "final average" earnings; "average
best" earnings; and "career average" earnings.
A "final" earnings formula is one which specifies a percentage
of the employee's earnings over his last year of service. A "final
average" earnings formula is one which specifies a percentage of
the employee's earnings as an average over a defined number of
years prior to retirement, multiplied by the number of his previous
years of service. An "average best" earnings is one which specifies
a percentage of the employee's earnings as an average over a
defined number of years in which the employee's earnings were at
their highest, multiplied by each year of service. A "career
average" earnings formula is one which specifies a percentage of
the employee's earnings averaged over his total years of service,
multiplied by the number of years of service.
3. "Integrated" PensionPlan
This type of plan provides in its formula for a reduction in
contributions and benefits according to the amount of benefits due
to the employee under the Canada Pension Plan. In other words, as
the employee's entitlement under the C.P.P. increases, his
entitlement under the private plan decreases commensurately, but
he ends up with the same overall benefit. "Integration" is common
to "defined contribution" and "defined benefit" plans. 4A It
follows that in order to assess the employee's pension position had
he not been fired, account ought to be taken of possible future
4a. In 1978, 41% of all plans were integrated: C.C.H. Guide Vol. I, at 2125,
supra, note 2.
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variations in his Canada Pension Plan benefit position, although in
practice the obstacle of making accurate predictions is insurmountable.
B. The Legal Structure of the Plan
1. At Common Law
At common law, the plan may either be a gratuity or a contract,
depending on the intention of the parties. 5 Evidence of an intention
to establish a gift would be if the plan expressly refutes any
contractual force, or subjects entitlement to the employer's
discretion, or permits the employer to modify unilaterally vested
benefits. In that case, whereas the employee might reasonably
expect the employer to honour the gift, no legal obligation arises
prior to actual payment of the benefit, at which time the gift become
complete. If the plan is contractual, it may be either a unilateral
contract or a bilateral contract subject to a condition, the "requested
act/condition" in both instances being satisfaction of the vesting
provisions in the plan. It follows that the employee prima facie is
not entitled to any benefits unless and until those provisions are met.
In reality, however, the employee can reasonably expect that he will
not be prevented from satisfying the vesting conditions by the
employer's act of unlawfully dismissing him. This reality could be
reflected in the legal structure in two ways. First, it is arguable that
unlawful dismissal violates a duty on the employer not to thwart
deliberately the satisfaction of the condition, such duty arising from
either an implied term of the plan itself if viewed as a condition
going to performance rather than obligation, 6 or from an implied
term in the employment contract, or from a collateral contract 7
ancillary to the plan and/or the employment contract. Second, if the
plan is a unilateral contract, there is authority suggesting that the
promisor cannot revoke his promise once performance has
commenced without affording the promisee reasonable time to
complete it. 8 It is strongly arguable that unlawful dismissal would
5. The following description of the legal structure is based largely on Fichaud, at
pp. 405-410, supra, note 2, wherein the authorities are cited.
6. By analogy with Dynamic Transport v. O.K. Detailing(1978), 20 N.R. 500 at
510-511 (S.C.C.). See also Dawson v. Helicopter Exploration Co., [1955] S.C.R.
868, [1955] 5 D.L.R. 404.
7. By analogy with Re Dominion Stores (1973), 2 O.R. (3d) 279 (H.C.).
8. Erringtonv. Errington, [1952] 1 K.B. 2 90per Denning L.J. (C.A.);Daulia v.
FourMillbankNominees,[1978] 2 All E.R. 557 at 561 (C.A.).
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be unreasonable in this context. The significance of those two
possible legal actions is that the employee would be compensated
for loss of his "real-world" reasonable expectancies as regards his
pension, 9 not just for his dejure legal entitlements. There is no case
law on those two possibilities in Canada.
The legal structure of the plan must take account of its express
provisions. The following provisions are particularly relevant. First,
the plan may have a minimum service qualification requirement
and/or a provision making continued eligibility dependent on the
maintenance of ongoing "employee" status. Second, the plan
may contain rules for the withdrawal of accrued benefits prior to
vesting. Thus the employee is usually entitled to withdraw his own
past contributions, and less frequently those of his employer, if his
employment terminates before vesting. Third, the plan will describe
when benefits vest, whereupon the employee becomes legally
entitled to the value of his own and his employer's past
contributions. It is rare for benefits to vest automatically with
on-going service, notwithstanding that the employer's contributions
are part and parcel of the total compensation package and ought
realistically to be viewed as deferred wages, an earned "right."' 1
Fourth, the plan may contain "locking-in," or "freezing"
provisions which guarantee the employee a deferred pension at
retirement by preventing him from withdrawing either parties'
contributions, or from otherwise surrendering his benefits for a cash
sum, if his employment ceases before retirement. Alternatively, and
whilst permitting the employee to surrender his vested benefits upon
pre-retirement termination, the plan may state that he must forfeit
the employer's past contributions if he elects that option. Fifth, the
plan may infrequently contain a "portability" provision, whereby
the employer agrees to transfer the employee's accrued benefits to
the pension fund of a successive employer, either automatically or
at the request of the employee. Sixth, the plan may provide for
recovery of accrued benefits by the estate or the spouse of an
employee who dies prior to vesting.' 1 Otherwise, such benefits
primafacieare irrevocable since the vesting condition will not have
9. Infra, p. 349.
10. See Fichaud, at pp. 407-408, supra, note 2. In "Better Pensions for
Canadians" (Minister of Supply and Service Canada, 1982), at 12, the federal
government endorses the automatic vesting philosophy as part of its pension reform
strategy.
11. See eg. PensionBenefit StandardsAct, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-8, s. 13 and Pension
Benefit StandardsRegulations, S.O.R. Cons./78, Vol. 13, p. 10131.
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been met. Lastly, the plan may provide for post retirement forfeiture
of the whole or part of the pension in defined circumstances, e.g.
working for a competitor in breach of a restrictive covenant.12
2. StatutoryIntervention
The legal structure must take account of pension benefit legislation
in all jurisdictions. 13 Attention is focussed herein on the Dominion
Pension Benefits Standards Act, 14 which is substantially similar to
the legislation in most provinces. It should be noted that the
Government intends to amend significantly this Act as part of its
strategy of revamping the entire retirement income system, 15 which
may be a lengthy process. The salient features of the current
legislation are as follows. First, section 10(1) (a) requires that the
plan "contractually provide" for vesting after ten years of
"continuous service" and attainment of forty-five years of age. 15A
An exception is made in respect to that portion of the benefit which
is attributable to voluntary, additional contributions by the
employee. Secondly, provision is made for compulsory "locking
in" of benefits which have vested pursuant to section 10(1)(a). The
employee cannot surrender or commute his benefits for a cash
payment during his lifetime, 16 nor can he withdraw any of his own
12. The provision may be held void as an unreasonable restraint of trade, as in
Taylor v. McQuilkin et al. (1968), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 463 at 469-470 (Man. Q.B.). See
alsoBull v. Pitney Bowes Ltd., [1967] 1 W.L.R. 273 (Thesiger J.).
13. Pension Benefits Act R.S.A. 1966 c. 69 as am. and Pension Benefit Act
Regulations, Alta. Reg. 446/66, December 22, 1966 as am.; Manitoba Pension
Benefits Act, R.S.M. 1975 c. 38 as am. and Regs. 139/76 as am.; Nova Scotia
Pension Benefits Act R.S.N.A. 1975 c. 14 as am. and Pension Benefits Act
Regulations, approved by Governor Council, December 7, 1976: Ontario Pension
Benefits Act R.S.O. 1980 c. 373 as am. and Pension Benefits Act Regulations,
Reg. 746, R.R.O. 1980 as am.; An Act Respecting Supplemental Pension Plans
R.S.Q. 1965 c. R-17 as am. and Supplementary Pension Plans Act Regs. R.R.Q.
1981 c. R-17 r-1 as am.; Saskatchewan Pension Benefits Act R.S.S. 1978 c. P-6 as
am. and Pension Benefit Regulations, Order in Council 733/81. In the above
jurisdictions, and in jurisdictions not having major pension legislation, statutes
exist which regulate pensions in specific industries, such as teaching. Those
statutes are cited in the C.C.H. Guide, Vol. 1, supra, note 2. On the Nova Scotia
legislation, see Anne Mac L. Malick, "Private Pensions - A Legislative Response
- Nova Scotia's Pension Benefits Act" (1976), 2 Dal. L.J. 703.
14. Supra, note 11.
15. These proposals are described in "Better Pensions for Canadians," supra,
note 10.
15A. Section 16(1) of the Saskatchewan Pension Benefits Act is unique in
providing vesting after one year's service and 45 years of age.
16. Section 10(1)(c).
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contributions to the fund. 17 The major exceptions to these "locking
in" provisions are as follows.' 8 They do not apply to that portion of
the benefit attributable to voluntary, additional contributions by the
employee, nor to the first 25% of the commuted value of benefit. 19
Nor do they apply to a benefit which entitles the employee to a
monthly pension benefit of less than $10.20 In all of these instances,
therefore, the employee who terminates before retirement can
withdraw as a cash sum the amounts in question. Thirdly, section
10(1)(b) prohibits the employee from assigning or alienating any
part of his pension benefit, irrespective of whether the benefit has
vested, except for such portion of the benefit that is attributable to
his voluntary, additional contributions.
C. The Employee's Positionin the LabourMarket
The extent of the employee's pension benefit losses will depend on
the following factors. First, it is necessary to predict what would
have happened to the employee had he remained on the job. His
losses would be limited in proportion to his chances of being
lawfully terminated prior to retirement by, for example, his
quitting, taking early retirement, being fired for an industrial
offence, being declared redundant or the firm ceasing operations or
being taken over by a successor employer which discontinues the
plan. Indeed, the plan may provide for the forefeiture of defined
benefits in those instances. In any case, the employee would
obviously cease to improve his pension position beyond such a
termination. In particular, if there is a strong chance that
termination would occur before vesting, the employee would be
deprived of the benefit of the employer's contributions. On the other
hand, the employee's losses would be increased in proportion to his
chances of receiving periodic wage increases, which may derive
from an annual across-the-board increase for all employees, or from
a promotion or individual bonus. Thus, the employee's personal
career and salary progress must be predicted along with the
company's general wage policy. In addition, account must be taken
of likely amendments to the plan itself, either voluntarily by the
parties or by legislation, over the employee's projected period of
employment with the company, which may or may not enhance the
17.
18.
19.
20.

Section 10(1)(d).
The other exceptions are also contained in s. 10(2).
Section 10(2)(c).
Section 10(2)(b).
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employee's position. In this regard, if the Dominion Government's
reforms are implemented, all plans in the federal jurisdiction will
have to provide for vesting after two years of service, for improved
treatment of spouses, for more rigorous "locking in" provisions
and for improved portability. 2 1 The chances are that the provinces
will eventually follow this lead.
Second, it is necessary to predict the employee's career progress
and pension progress with successive employers. 2 2 The starting
point is that the employee will have lost, and must be compensated
for, the opportunity to improve his benefits during the period he is
unemployed following his discharge. This is easy to determine
where the employee has secured alternative employment by the date
of the hearing. If not, it is necessary to project his likely period of
unemployment, having regard to labour market factors such as the
present and anticipated availability of reasonably suitable job
openings, the employee's age and abilities, and his opportunities for
retraining under private or government schemes.
In addition, the pension benefits offered in successive jobs must
be compared with those in the old job. The employee's pension
losses will represent only the amount to which the benefits provided
in the successive plan are less favourable to him than those in the
old. In making the comparison, all of the terms of the plan must be
examined 23 in order to produce an overall value. In particular, any
qualifying period in the successive plan, whereby the employee
must have accumulated defined seniority before he can become a
member, must be compensated. Moreover, if the successive job
does not provide a pension but offers a substantially higher total
compensation package, it might be reasonable to assume that the
difference is intended to offset commensurately the absence of a
pension and should be utilized by the employee to buy a pension of
his own. If so, the employee will not have sustained the pension
21. "Better Pensions for Canadians" at pp. 56-57, supra, note 10.
22. The exercise is basically the same as determining the "cut-off' for
compensating general damages flowing from an "unjust" discharge under section
61.5(9) of the Canada Labour Code. On this see G. England, "Unjust dismissal in
the federal jurisdiction! the first three years" (1982), 12 Man. L.J. 8, at 25-28, and
since then the adjudication award in Willberg v. Jo-Ann Trucking Ltd., at 22-33,
September 1982 (England).
23. A good example of how this can be done is illustrated in Willment Bros. Ltd. v.
Oliver (1979), 1 C.R. 378 (E.A.T.), a case arising under the British unfair
dismissal legislation currently contained in the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, c. 44 as am.

352 The Dalhousie Law Journal

losses that appear on the surface. If the employee's contributions to
his own pension fund entail less favourable taxation breaks than if
he had remained in the old fund, the difference is a loss for which he
should be compensated. It should also be remembered that the
employee's likely salary and career progress must be assessed in the
successive job because the pension it offers, whilst less favourable
initially than the old one, could foreseeably catch up and eventually
surpass it. Conversely, if the successive job is less secure,
apparently superior pension benefits would in fact be less
favourable to the employee than in his old job.
Furthermore, certain personal characteristics of the employee
must be taken into account. If the employee's chances of surviving
to retirement are low due to sickness or poor health, or if his
post-retirement longevity is likely to be short, it follows that his
pension losses are reduced accordingly. The converse is true if his
chances of reaching retirement and his longevity expectancy
thereafter are good. If the plan provides for surviving spousal
benefits, and having regard to the employee's actual or anticipated
marital status, the early death of the employee himself would not
serve to "cut-off" his losses. Moreover, assuming that the
employee is a sensible "economic man," he will invest the
"accelerated"
capital sum which he receives by way of
compensation for pension benefit losses and receive interest income
which he would not otherwise have received had he accumulated his
pension benefits in the normal way. The amount by which such
interest exceeds the projected interest which the employee would
have been credited with had he remained in the fund should be
deducted from his damages as being a windfall to him. This entails,
therefore, predicting the interest return on the fund's investment as
well as on the employee's investment.
In sum, the "real-world" pension benefit losses of the unlawfully
dismissed employee will depend on the benefit structure of his plan,
the legal structure of his plan and a variety of economic factors
relating to his personal position in the labour market as outlined
above. Next, it is proposed to examine how the law measures those
losses for the purpose of compensating the employee. Attention is
focussed on the common law of wrongful dismissal, the arbitral
jurisprudence on "just cause," and the statutory protection against
"unjust" discharge in section 61.5 of the Canada Labour Code,
with special reference to the jurisprudence arising under the British
unfair dismissal legislation.
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I. The Legal Response to Measuring the Employee's Pension
Benefit Losses
A. The Common Law of Wrongful Dismissal
The philosophies governing the measure of damages in a wrongful
dismissal action are, firstly, that the employee is only entitled to
compensation for contractually-based expectancies and, secondly,
that the employer would have performed the contract in the manner
least disadvantageous to himself. This means that the employee can
only recover damages for benefits which the employer would have
been contractually obliged to give him during the period of notice
required to terminate lawfully the contract. 2 4 In the context of
pension benefit losses, it follows that the cut-off date for assessing
future losses is the date when lawful notice to terminate would
25
expire.
As regards the employee's entitlement to benefits accruing up to
the date of dismissal, this is normally a matter between the
employee and the pension fund and has nothing to do with the
wrongful dismissal action. 2 6 As regards the position between the
date of dismissal and the cut-off date, the employee is a wrongful
dismissal action ought theoretically to recover his employer's
24. See generally I.M. Christie, Employment Law in Canada (Butterworths,
1980), at 385-407; M.R. Freedland, The Contract of Employment (Clarendon
Press, 1976), at 244-272.
25. Eg. Mayhew v. Canron Inc. (No. 1) (1982), 98 A.P.R. 278 (N.S.S.C.);
Sturrock v. Xerox of CanadaLtd., [19771 1 A.C.W.S. 203 (B.C.S.C.); Bardal v.
Globe and Mail Ltd., [1960] O.W.N. 253 at 255 (H.Ct.); Bagby v. Gustavson
InternationalDrillingCo. Ltd. et al. (1980), 24 A.R. 181 at 203 (S.C. App. Div.);
McKilligan v.Pacific VocationalInstitute, [1979] 3 A.C.W.S. 94 (B.C.S.C.). The
leading British authority to the same effect is Bold v. Brough, Nicholson Ltd.,
[1964] 1 W.L.R. 201 (Q.B.).
26. Bagby v. Gustavson InternationalDrilling Co. Ltd. et al. (1979), 20 A.R. 244
at 261 (S.C.), which was not overruled on this point on appeal, supra, note 25.
Presumably, an action would exist against the employer under the employment
contract only if, and to the extent that the plan is expressly or impliedly
incorporated therein. Such a possibility was suggested in Taylor v. McQuilkin et al.
(1968), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 463 at 466. In contrast, Freedland, "The Contract of
Employment," at 254, supra, note 24, implies that the employee can always
recover by way of contractual debt in the wrongful dismissal action for his own and
his employer's past contributions. It is submitted that in Canada the proper forum
would normally not be the wrongful dismissal action, and that the employer's past
contributions in any event should theoretically only be recoverable if they have
vested, or would have become vested during the proper notice period. On the
problems which the employee encounters in an action against the fund, see
Christie, "Employment Law in Canada," at 234-235 and especially the cases cited
in footnote 600, supra, note 24.
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contributions for that period since the employer would have been
contractually bound to pay them had he remained in the job, but
only if vesting has occurred, or would have occurred before the
cut-off date. Otherwise, in the absence of such vesting, the
employee would not be entitled to the employer's contributions in
an action against the fund. 2 7 It would be odd were the employee not
to recover forprior, non-vested employer contributions but were to
recover for future ones! Yet the courts appear to compensate the
employee for the loss of future employer contributions without
mentioning whether vesting will have occurred before the expiry of
the notice period.2 8 The judgements do not seem to attach any
importance to vesting in this context. One exception is Sturrock v.
Xerox of Canada Ltd., 2 9 where the British Columbia Supreme
Court held that because vesting would have occurred before the
expiry of the notice period, the employee was entitled to
compensation equivalent to the market value of his pension benefit
as of that date. In Bardel v. Globe and Mail Ltd., 30 where the
Ontario High Court awarded compensation for the employer's
specific contributions over a twelve month notice period, no"
mention was made of vesting. In that case, however, it may well be
that vesting had occurred since the employee had approximately 17
years seniority. Insofar as the courts do compensate for future
employer contributions in the absence of vesting, it is submitted that
this is theoretically unsound according to the principle of restitutio
in integrum. It may be that the courts are deliberately overlooking
this obstacle in order to avoid an unjust enrichment to the employer
if he kept the contributions. If this is the underlying concern, it is
submitted that rather than give the employee a windfall, the court
should order the employer to pay the amount into the fund, (even
though the employer may also indirectly benefit by an enrichment of

27. This must logically follow if the vesting conditions prescribed in the plan (or
the legislation) have not been satisfied. See Fichaud, "Pensions: A Primer for
Lawyers", at 378-379 and 407-408, supra, note 2. A recent illustration in the
collective bargaining context is Nero et al. v. Rygus et al. (1981), 33 O.R. (2d) 445
(H.C.).
28. Eg. Bardal v. Globe and Mail Ltd., supra, note 25; McKilligan v. Pacific
Vocational Institute, supra, note 25; Bagby v. Gustavson InternationalDrilling
Co. Ltd. et al., supra, note 25 for the Court of Appeal and note 26 for the Trial
Division; Mayhew v. CanronInc. (No. 1) (1982), 98 A.P.R. 278 (N.S.S.C.).
29. Supra, note 25.
30. At p. 25 5 , supra, note 25.
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the fund). After all, it is the fund and the participants therein who
really sustain the loss in this situation.
Assuming that the benefit of the employer's future contributions
is prima facie compensable, the courts have utilized two methods
for calculating the amount of that benefit. First, they have directed
the employer to pay the exact contribution he would have paid
pursuant to the terms of the plan. 23 This is simple but crude,
especially where the employee's notice period is long 32 and/or the
employee's pension position depends on the various kinds of
formulae common to "defined benefit" plans. 3 3 Likewise, it is
difficult to compute where there is no specific amount of periodic
employer contributions relating to each employee. 34 In those
situations, a more accurate assessment would have to include
predictions as to the labour market and pension positions of the
employee at a time which may well be two years down the road.
Even then it might be difficult to ascertain specific employer
contributions relating to each employee. 3 5 This method, therefore,
is best suited to employees with "defined contribution" plans
whose notice period is relatively short and where a specific periodic
36
employer contribution is readily identifiable. Second, in one case
the court calculated the benefit by asking how much it would cost
the employee to buy pension benefits of equal value to those to
which he would have been entitled at the expiry of his notice period
according to the market price at that time. This "future oriented"
approach is obviously more accurate in cases of longer notice
periods and/or "defined benefit" formulae because it entails
predictions of the benefit and legal structures of the plan and the
employee's labour market and pension positions, along the lines
described earlier. 37 Unfortunately, in that one case 38 in which this
31. Eg. McKilligan v. Pacific VocationalInstitute, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 201.
32. The current trend is for courts to award longer notice periods, and the
prevailing heavy unemployment is likely to preserve the trend. See D. Harris,
WrongfulDismissal (DeBoo Ltd., 2 ed., 1980), at 71-77.
33. Supra, p. 349.
34. Eg. in the "controlled" funding plan described in Willment Bros. Ltd. v.
Oliver, supra, note 23 which is discussed infra, p.
. For other examples of such
uncertain contributions see Fichaud, "Pensions: A Primer for Lawyers," at
389-390, supra, note 2.
35. See supra,note 34 and accompanying text.
36. Sturrock v. Xerox of CanadaLtd., [1977] 1 A.C.W.S. 203 (B.C.S.C.).
37. Supra, pp. 350-352.
38. Sturrock v. Xerox of CanadaLtd., supra, note 36.
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approach was used, the judge did not expand on how he measured
the above mentioned variables in order to produce the final figure so
that it is impossible to comment on how sophisticated his actuarial
methodology was.
The major drawback of the common law response is its failure to
compensate losses that will foreseeably ensue beyond the expiry of
the notice period. 39 It means, for example, that a wrongfully
dismissed 55 year old employee with an "average best earnings"
based "defined benefit" plan, who has no chance of finding
successive employment before retirement, but whose employment
contract expressly contains a three month notice period, will be
entitled only to three months worth of employer contributions by
way of damages, notwithstanding that the employer's wrongful act
has foreseeably deprived him of his best earning years. It also
means that a wrongfully dismissed employee with nine years
seniority, being one year short of vesting, 40 and whose contract
contains an express three month notice provision, will be deprived
of an accrued pension benefit based on his employer's past
contributions, notwithstanding that he would have almost certainly
attained vesting seniority had he not been dismissed. At the most he
will stand to recover three months worth of employer contributions
by way of damages, and even that is theoretically unsound! 4 1 It may
be possible to circumvent the obstacle of the notice period by basing
damages not on the employment contract, but on an ancillary,
independent contract. It was suggested earlier that if the pension
contract is viewed as either a unilateral contract or a bilateral
contract subject to a condition, the employer could be regarded as
having impliedly promised not to thwart deliberately the employee
from attempting to meet the vesting provisions and, a fortiori, from
attempting to participate further in the venture after vesting. 42 A
wrongful dismissal would surely be breach of such an obligation. In
order to compensate for the losses of the opportunities to vest and to
proceed further with the venture, the courts would presumably have
39. The same criticism can be made of the common law limitation on general
damages arising from wrongful dismissal.
40. The minimum statutory vesting period is 10 years, provided that the employee
is also at least 45 years of age, eg. Dominion Pension Benefits StandardsActs,
R.S.C. 1970, c. P-8, s. 10(l)(a). Section 16(1) of Saskatchewan's The Pension
Benefits Act R.S.C. 1978, c. P-6 is unique in providing for vesting after 45 years of
age and only one year of service.
41. For the reasons see supra, p. 354.
42. Supra, pp. 347-348.
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to predict the employee's foreseeable "real-world" losses, having
regard to the economic variables and the benefit and legal structures
of the plan mentioned earlier. 4 3 To the author's knowledge, this
argument has not been canvassed in a reported Canadian case. One
44
English decision might arguably be read as implicitly rejecting it,
although the argument was not put in exactly the above form in that
case.
B. The Arbitral Jurisprudence of Discharge Without "Just
45
Cause"
The problem of compensating the unlawfully discharged employee
for loss of his future pension benefits has not been addressed in the
reported arbitral jurisprudence. 4 6 This is partly because in the vast
majority of awards in which discharge is found to be without
"cause" the grievor has been reinstated, perhaps subject to an
unpaid suspension in instances of contributory blameworthiness.
The issue could conceivably arise were a grievor to request
compensation without reinstatement, in which case the duty to
mitigate would presumably require that his refusal of reinstatement
be supported by reasonable grounds. Otherwise, it is a moot
question whether an arbitrator has jurisdiction to refuse reinstatement of his own accord if discharge is without "cause," at least
where the collective agreement does not expressly empower him to
do so.4 7 On the one hand, it is arguable that if the grievor is denied
reinstatement, albeit subject to compensation, he is in fact being
43. Supra, p. 350.
44. Bold v. Brough, Nicholson Ltd., 1964] 1 W.L.R. 201.
45. The arbitral jurisprudence on the remedial aspects of "just cause" is described
in D. Brown and D. Beatty, CanadianLabourArbitration(Agincourt: Canada Law
Books, 1977), at 56-59 and 64 and in E. Palmer, Collective Agreement Arbitration
in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1978), at 35-5 1.
46. If the employee is awarded reinstatement, the employer will be ordered to
make up his part of the employee's pension position during the hiatus, for example
by paying into the fund the full amount of employer contributions and making
"...such further or other financial arrangements with the trustees of the pension
plan to reinstate the grievor's entitlement under the pension plan so that his rights
thereunder will not be adversely affected by the company's failure to make timely
contributions," per arbitrator O'Shea in Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America Local 880 and Direct Winters Transport Ltd., L.A.N.
December, 1975 at 7.
47. Where compensation without reinstatement has been ordered in cases of
discharge without "cause," one arbitrator has based his decision on expressly
permissive language: Fibreglas CanadaLtd., [1976] 1 W.L.A.C. 464 (Sychuk).
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disciplined, (if not discharged) in the face of collective agreement
language which generally requires that discipline/discharge be for
"cause." Nor could the arbitrator rely on the common provision in
collective agreements and the labour relations legislation empowering him to substitute a lesser "penalty," namely a compensated
discharge, because that is only permissable upon finding "cause"
for some sort of "penalty." ' 48 On the other hand, there are
situations in which it doubtlessly makes good labour relations sense
that an entirely blameless grievor not be reinstated, e.g. if there has
been an irretrievable breakdown in personal relationships between the
grievor and a supervisor or work group where a close relationship is
essential to the job. 49 It is arguable that an arbitrator has an implicit
mandate, deriving from the purpose which arbitration is deemed to
have under the labour relations legislation and the collective
agreement of effectively resolving grievances at work, to apply such
remedies as he sees fit in order to achieve that purpose. At least one
arbitrator 50 has ordered termination with compensation explicitly on
this ground, relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Polymer 51 and the Attorney-General of
Newfoundland5 2 cases, and on a law review article by Professor
Paul Weiler. 53 This approach would see the statutory substitution of
penalty provision in historical context as a response to the Port
Another based his decision on the unique provisions in sections 92, 92(3) and 98 of
the British Columbia Labour Code, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 212 as am.: Douglas
Technical College (1977), 16 L.A.C. (2d.) 139 (Munroe). Another stated that this
is inherently within the jurisdiction of an arbitrator without saying why: Health
Labour Relations Association of British Columbia, (1977] 1 W.L.A.C. 250
(Maclntyre). Another simply did it without bothering, it seems, with the
jurisdictional issue: Research Industries Ltd., [1977] 2 W.L.A.C. 277 (Thompson). The latter two decisions, arising from British Columbia, are arguably based
on the Labour Code of that province, but the arbitrators did not make this clear.
48. Eg. AlbertaLabourRelationsAct, R.S.A. 1980 (supp.), c. LI-1, s. 125(2).
49. As in Douglas Technical College (1977), 16 L.A.C. (2d) 139 (Munroe);
FibreglasCanadaLtd., [1976], W.L.A.C. 464 (Sychuk); and in Hotel Employees
and RestaurantEmployees andBartendersInternationalUnion, Local 73 and The
Elks Club of Lethbridge, unreported, March 30, 1982 (Virtue).
50. The Elks Club ofLethbridge, id.
51. Polymer Corp. Ltd. (1959), 10 L.A.C. 51 (Laskin); affd. 26 D.L.R. (2d) 609
(Ont. H.C.); affd. 28 D.L.R. (2d) 81 (Ont. C.A.); affd. 33 D.L.R. (2d) 124
(S.C.C.). (sub nom. Imbleau v. Laskin).
52. Newfoundland Association of Public Employees v. A.-G. for Newfoundland
(1977), 77 C.L.L.C. 14. 085 (S.C.C.).
53. P. Weiler, "The Remedial Authority of the Labour Arbitrator: Revised
Judicial Version" (1974), 52 Can. Bar Rev. 29.
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Arthur5 4 decision, namely as an attempt to buttress the arbitrator's
powers to fashion sensible labour relations remedies, not as an
attempt to restrict other remedies by exclusionary inference. It must
be remembered, however, that another purpose of the labour
relations legislation is to enhance collective "freedom to contract,"
so that an employee who is effectively discharged by an order of the
arbitrator when he is totally blameless might well have a valid
complaint that his express fights are being overridden. In light of the
courts' track record in reviewing the remedial innovations 5 5 of
arbitrators it is possible that the arbitrator may very well not have
such inherent jurisdiction.
Assuming that an arbitrator has jurisdiction to compensate
without reinstatement, the question of how the employee's damages
should be measured is largely unanswered in the jurisprudence, 5 6
and unfortunately, no mention is made of pension benefits in the
few awards on point. Where the issue of measuring general
damages has arisen in other contexts, such as damages for illegal
strikes, 57 arbitrators have applied the traditional contract law
measure in Hadley v. Baxendale,58 namely that only such losses as
are within the actual or reasonable contemplation of the parties at
the date the contract was made are compensable. An alternative
approach suggested by Professor Brown 59 is that any losses which
are "proximately caused" by the breach should be compensable,
notwithstanding that the parties did not reasonably compensate them
when they executed the contract. Whichever approach is taken, it is
clear that an arbitrator would have considerable leeway to
54. Port Arthur Shipbuilding Company v. Arthurs, [1969] S.C.R. 85. The
philosophy of that decision, if not its ratio decidendi, must be seriously questioned
after the remarks of Laskin C.J. in A.-G. for Newfoundland, (1977), 77 C.L.L.C.
14.085 (S.C.C.) at 14.695-14.696.
55. The courts' record is criticized severely by Weiler, "The Remedial Authority
of the Labour Arbitrator," supra, note 53.
56. In Health LabourRelations Association of British Columbia, supra, note 47,
the arbitrator stated that the object is to compensate, but did not elaborate. No
rationale is given for the monetary awards in the other cases cited in footnote 47,
supra. In The Elks Club of Lethbridge, supra note 49, the methodology smacks
strongly of the common law of wrongful dismissal.
57. Eg. Polymer CorporationLtd. (1959), 10 L.A.C. 51 (Laskin).
58. (1854), 9 Ex. 341; 156 E.R. 145 (Ex. Ct.), as amplified by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd. (HeronII), [1969]
1 A.C. 350.
59. R. Brown, "Contract Remedies in a Planned Economy: Labour Arbitration
Leads the Way" in B. Reiter and J. Swan (eds.), Studies in ContractLaw (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1980), at 93 ff, and especially at 111.
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compensate the employee for his "real-world" pension losses,
being unencumbered by any notice period "cut-off' date, and the
more so under Professor Brown's wider approach.
C. Section 61.5 of the Canada Labour Code and the British
Experience
On September 1, 1978, employees within the federal jurisdiction
acquired protection against "unjust" discharge with the coming
into force of section 61.5 of the Canada Labour Code. 60 The
remedial authority of the adjudicator is extremely broad by virtue of
section 61.5(9)(c), which empowers him to require the employer to
"...do any other like thing that is equitable to ...

do in order to

remedy or counteract any consequence of the dismissal." In one
case the adjudicator described the rationale of the section as
follows.
The starting point is to recognize the "make whole" philosophy
which underpins the section. The section should be applied in
order to counteract the mischief at which it is aimed, namely the
perceived inadequacies of the measure of damages in a common
law wrongful dismissal action. At common law the philosophies
underlying the assessment of damages are, first, to put the
employee in the same position as if the contract had been
performed and, second, the assumption that the employer would
have performed his obligations in the manner least disadvantageous to himself. These philosophies are reflected in the
fundamental principle that the employee can only recover
employment benefits to which he is contractually entitled for the
period of the lawful notice to terminate the contract. Consequently, compensation is not awarded for reasonable expectancies not based in the contract, nor for losses which accrue after
the due notice period, notwithstanding that such losses are
attributable to the wrongful dismissal. In order to cure that
mischief, section 61.5(9)(c) should be applied so as to "make
whole" the consequences of the dismissal, i.e. to compensate the
employee for the real world losses sustained as a result of the
unlawful dismissal.61
In particular, the section has been utilized frequently to
compensate but not reinstate the "unjustly" dismissed employee. 62
60. See generally England, "Unjust discharge in the federal jurisdiction: the first
three years," supra, note 22.
61. Willberg v. Jo-Ann Trucking Ltd., supra, note 22 at 22-23.
62. As of March 31, 1981, of the 35 adjudications in which discharge was held to
be "unjust," compensation without reinstatement was ordered in 15: Arbitration
Services Reporter Vol. 5, No. 5, May 1981, at 2-3.

Compensation for Pension Benefit Losses 361

One would therefore expect that the problem of awarding damages
for pension benefit losses would have been considered fully in the
jurisprudence. Unfortunately it has not. In most cases adjudicators
simply hand down a lump sum award with minimal effort at
supporting rationalization, and in only one instance has the issue of
pension benefit losses been directly addressed. In Willberg v.
Jo-Ann Trucking Ltd.6 3 the adjudicator, having held that the
compensable period should run from the date of discharge on
December 14, 1981 up to the cut-off date of July 31, 1982, stated,
First, there is a pension plan to which employer and employee
jointly contribute and in which Mr. Willberg participated from
his date of hiring. The issue of how to apply the "make whole"
philosophy to compensate for loss of pension benefits is fraught
with difficulties .... Mr. Willberg had only been with the
company for approximately two years, is still relatively young in
his late 20's and can reasonably be expected to have a substitute
pension plan through his own business or through another
company if he ever re-enters the labour market. In this sort of
case, the "make whole" policy of section 61.5(9)(c) can most
readily be applied by giving Mr. Willberg a sum of money which
he can then add to his other monies, in order to buy himself two
years of pension benefits when he retires. This sum should
comprise Mr. Willberg's contributions to the pension plan and
the employer's contributions up to December 14; plus the
contributions which the employer would have made between
December 14, 1981 and July 31, 1982; plus compound interest at
the rate of 12% per annum. Had Mr. Willberg been closer to
retirement and paid in for a longer period, the method of
his loss of expected benefits would have
compensating
64
differed.
Presumably, the adjudicator in awarding the return of the
employee's past contributions must have assumed that those either
had not, or could not be recovered by him pursuant to the terms of
the plan, otherwise the employee would have made a windfall. If
the employee has recovered his own contributions they should
obviously be discounted. Presumably, too, the adjudicator must
have assumed that the employee would have remained with the firm
until vesting in order to justify recovery of the employer's
contributions. Also, it is significant that the adjudicator did not have
sufficient evidence before him to specify an exact money amount.
Instead, he provided the parties with a formula to plug the data into,
63. Supra, note 22.
64. Supra, note 22 at 26-27.
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with a reservation of jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising
therefrom. 6 5 This illustrates the problem of proof of pension losses,
which will be averred to later. 66 In addition, it is significant that the
adjudicator emphasized the unique circumstances of Mr. Willberg's
labour market and pension positions as justifying this method of
calculating the benefit, namely his short pensionable service and his
youth. Given that an employee's pension position is usually gauged
in terms of benefits, not contributions, to use as the yardstick
accrued contributions will rarely be accurate, especially with high
seniority rated employees approaching retirement. Moreover, this
method would be inaccurate where the benefit structure of the plan
pegs the rate of employer contributions as an average over all
employees, making it impossible to allocate the contributions to a
given individual. 6 7 Lastly, the adjudicator failed to make a discount
for the fact that the employee would receive an accelerated payment
which he could invest and recoup interest on, although in the
circumstances of the short compensable period this would have been
a relatively small amount. The Willberg decision, therefore, throws
little light on how adjudicators should handle the hard cases. The
more highly developed jurisprudence under the British unfair
dismissal legislation provides some useful pointers.
1. The British Experience
It is not proposed to scrutinize the minutiae of the case law, merely
to highlight those features likely to provide guidance for Canadian
legal umpires. 68 The overriding philosophy of the English
legislation is to compensate the employee for his "real-world"
65. Supra, note 22 at 33-34.
66. Infra, p. 371.
67. A good example is Willment Brothers Ltd. v. Oliver, (1979), 1 C.R. 378
(E.A.T.) which is discussed infra, p.
68. Employment Protection (Consolidation)Act 1978, 1978, c. 44, Part V (U.K.).
A useful description of general law of unfair dismissal is contained in B. Hepple
and P. O'Higgins, "Encyclopedia of Labour Relations Law, Vol. I" (Sweet and
Maxwell, loose-leaf service). The major cases on compensating pension benefit
losses are described in detail in J.A. McGlyne, UnfairDismissal Cases 2d. ed.,
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1979), at 309-316. The best theoretical analyses are D.
Jackson, Unfair Dismissal, How and Why the Law Works (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1975) at 31 if, and D. Jackson, "Compensation for Loss of
Pension Rights in Cases of Unfair Dismissal" (1975), 4 I.L.J. 24. In Britain,
original jurisdiction over unfair dismissal vests in industrial tribunals, which are
locally based, with appeals on points of law vested in the Employment Appeal
Tribunal, a specialized labour law division of the High Court.
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losses, 69 and it has been emphasized time and again that there is no
universally "right" way of doing this. Rather, the compensating
goal must be achieved by use of plain, common-sense methodology
in the circumstances of each case. 70 There are four main areas:
compensation for loss of pension position accrued as of the
discharge date; compensation for loss of future pension position; the
employee's duty to mitigate his pension losses; and the problem of
proof of losses.
a) Loss ofAccrued PensionPosition
The industrial tribunals always distinguish the loss of the pension
position which has been earned from the loss of future pension
opportunities and compensate each loss under its - separate
heading. 7 1 This is essential because the two losses will not
necessarily be the same. As regards the former, tribunals have
utilized two methods of calculating the loss, the "contribution
method" and the "actuarial method," 7 2 both of which involve
consideration of the factors mentioned earlier arising from the
benefit and legal structures of the plan and the employee's position
73
in the labour market.
The "contribution method" begins by assessing the loss as the
value of the employee's and the employer's past contributions as of
69. Tesco StoresLtd. v. Heap, [19783 I.T.R. 17 at 22 (E.A.T.). The Employment
Protection(Consolidation)Act 1978, 1978, c.44, s.75 (U.K.) imposes a maximum
ceiling on overall compensation, which, of course, denies a truly compensatory
purpose.
70. See eg. Willment Brothers Ltd. v. Oliver (1979), I.C.R. 378 (E.A.T.),
wherein Slynn J. (at 383) re-affirmed an earlier dictum of Sir John Donaldson in
Copson v. Eversure Accessories Ltd., [1974] I.R.L.R. 247 at 249 (N.I.R.C.) that
"...(t)here is no one right way of proving or assessing the loss, but a broad
commonsense approach should be adopted. Evidence from actuaries or pension
brokers would certainly be relevant and admissable, but would not usually be
necessary. . ." To the same effect see the comments of Sir John Donaldson in
Scottish Co-op Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Lloyd, [1973] I.C.R. 137 at 142
(N.I.R.C.).
71. See the statements to that effect in Copson v. Eversure Accessories Ltd.,
[1974] 1.R.L.A. 247 at 249 and the authorities cited therein, and in Willment
BrothersLtd. v. Oliver (1979), I.C.R. 378 at 383 (E.A.T.).
72. These titles are taken from Government Actuary's Department "A Suggested
Method for Assessing Loss of Pension Rights under an Occupational Scheme
following a finding of Unfair Dismissal by our Industrial Tribunals," reproduced in
Hepple and O'Higgins, "Encyclopedia of Labour Relations Law, Vol. I," at 1380,
supra, note 68. (Hereinafter referred to as the British Government Actuary's
Department Guide.)
73. Supra, pp. 350-352.
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the date of dismissal, increased by compound interest from the date
of payment to take account of the fact that they would have been
invested and earned interest while they were in the fund. 7 4 The
tribunals have not sought to calculate precisely the rate of
compound interest, being satisfied that "rough and ready justice"
75
will be done by using as the yardstick the simple interest rate.
Discount is made for any past contributions actually received by the
employee, plus any interest earned therefrom. 76 Discount is also
made for the possibility that the employee may become disentitled
to his accrued benefit by the terms of the plan, for example if there
is a "real chance" 77 that he would resign, be lawfully fired, or take
an early retirement before vesting or retirement. It would be
repugnant with the compensatory philosophy were the employee to
recover the employer's past contributions if there was a "real
chance" that he would not have remained on payroll until vesting or
until retirement. 78 Thus in Manning v. R. and H. Wale Exports
Ltd., 79 where the plan provided for vesting after five years of
service and the tribunal was wholly satisfied that the employee
would have been lawfully terminated before then, the employer's
past contributions were not recoverable.
It may be that the benefit structure of the plan is such that the
precise value of the employer's past contributions in respect to each
employee cannot be ascertained. If so, the tribunal may assess a
"notional" value to the employer's contributions. In Willment
Brothers Ltd. v. Oliver"0 the plan was funded by the employees
contributing a certain percentage of their wage annually and the
employer contributing annually a lump sum in an amount required,
74. Eg. Copson v. EversureAccessories Ltd., [1974] 1.R.L.R. 247 at 249; Sturdy
Finance Ltd. v. Bardsley, [1979] I.R.L.R. 65 at 67 (E.A.T.) Gill v. Harold
Andrews SheepbridgeLtd., [1974] I.R.L.R. 109 at Ill (N.I.R.C.).
75. Copson v. EversureAccessories Ltd., [1974] 1.R.L.R. 247 at 249.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., at 250.
78. In those cases where compensation was made for the lost benefit of accrued
employer contributions, the tribunals have not alluded to the requirement that the
employee would have remained in the job until vesting, perhaps because the point
is so obvious. The benefit of accrued employer contributions was compensated in,
for instance, Copson v. Eversure Accessories Ltd., [1974] 1.R.L.R. 247; Gill v.
HaroldAndrewsSheepbridge Ltd., [1974] 1.R.L.R. 109; Hill v. Sabco Houseware
(U.K.) Ltd., [1977] I.R.L.R. 888, especially at 890 (E.A.T.); McKinney v.
Bieganek, [1973] I.R.L.R. 311 (N.I.R.C.).
79. [1979] I.C.R. 433 (E.A.T.).
80. (1979), 1.C.R. 378 (E.A.T.).
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according to an actuarial formula, to enable the fund to meet its
pension obligations for the year in question. In effect, the individual
employee paid more in per year than he got out per year in his
earlier years of service, eventually broke even, and in his later years
got more out per year than he paid in per year. At the date of his
unfair dismissal, Mr. Oliver had not reached break-even seniority.
The employer argued that since its annual contribution to the fund
had not as of that juncture purchased anything for the employee, he
should only be able to recover his own contributions. The
Employment Appeal Tribunal rejected the argument, holding
rightly that the employee had in fact been deprived of the chance to
buy in his later years pension benefits at a very low cost when the
employer's annual contribution would be carrying the burden.
Slynne J. compensated this loss by regarding the employer's de
facto annual payment into the fund as a percentage of the
employee's annual wage and therefore a "notional" contribution 8 l
to which the employee was entitled for each prior year of service.
Slynne J. rejected the alternative method, which was to take the cost
of an annuity to provide a pension which had already been
purchased at the time of dismissal, the capital sum required to make
the purchase being discounted at differing rates of interest. 8 2 He
regarded as the disadvantage the failure to take into account the
effects of inflation.8 3 The difficulty of assessing an individually
rated contribution in some plans, in addition to the deficiencies of
this method in compensating fully the employee who is relatively
close to retirement averred to earlier, 8 4 have resulted in the British
Government Actuary's Department recommending that the "contribution method" should only be used when pensionable service is
"very short, certainly less than five years." 8 5
The "actuarial method" of compensating loss of accrued pension
position begins by estimating the capital sum which would be
required at retirement to purchase an annuity equal to the pension to
which the employee would have been entitled at that date. 86 This
sum is then discounted, firstly, for an accelerated payment from
81. Ibid., at 385.
82. Ibid., at 384.

83. Ibid.

84. Supra, p. 363.
85. Supra, note 72, at para. 10.
86. See Copson v. Eversure Accessories Ltd., [1974] 1.R.L.R. 247 at 249; John
Millar andSons v. Quinn, [1974] I.T.R. 281 (N.I.R.C.); Smith Kline andFrench
Laboratoriesv. Coates, [1977] I.R.L.R. 220 at 222 (E.A.T.).
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which the employee can derive interest; and, secondly, for the
possibilities of his not remaining in his old job until vesting or
retirement, so long as there is a "real chance" of the possibility
materializing. 87 The British Government Actuary's Department
Guide recommends use of this method in all cases, and especially
when benefits received are a deferred pension. 88 If the employee's
benefits are portable or payable as a deferred pension on
retirement, it will not always be the case that he will have suffered
little, if any loss. 89 Thus in one case where the employee's deferred
pension was to be based on his last three years earnings before
retirement, which would have exceeded his earnings at the time of
dismissal, the Employment Appeals Tribunal held that there would
be a compensable loss. 90 Lastly, it should be noted that the duty to
mitigate and the problem of proving pension losses, which are
discussed later, 9 1 apply to both methods.
b) Loss of FuturePensionPosition
This head of damages compensates the employee for the reasonable
expectation that, had he not been unfairly dismissed, he would have
gone on improving his pension position with the firm. Tribunals
have utilized two methods for assessing such losses. The first takes
the value of the employer's contributions at the date of dismissal
and, treating the employer's contributions as equivalent to future
earnings, simply awards them to the employee until he acquires
another job. 92 If the second job does not have a pension plan, the
employee continues to recover the employer's contributions, at least
until his wages in the new job become large enough for him to buy
equivalent benefits out of his own pocket. If the second job does
87. Copson v. EversureAccessoriesLtd., [1974] I.R.L.R. 247 at 250.
88. Supra, note 72 at para 10(2).
89. See the dictum to this effect in Copson v. Eversure Accessories Ltd., [1974]
1.R.L.R. 247 at 250. Thus in Yeats v. Fairey Winches Ltd., [1974] I.R.L.R. 362
(Plymouth Tribunal), no compensation for pension losses was made where the
accrued benefits were "locked-in" until retirement.
90. Sturdy FinanceLtd. v. Bardsley, [1979] 1.R.L.R. 65. See also the dictum in
Smith, Kline and FrenchLaboratoriesv. Coates, [1977] I.R.L.R. 220 at 222.
91. Infra, p. 370 and p. 371 respectively.
92. See Copson v. Eversure Accessories Ltd., [1974] 1.R.L.R. 247 at 250;
Willment Brothers Ltd. v. Oliver (1979), I.C.R. 378 at 383; Smith, Kline and
French Laboratories v. Coates, [1979] 1.R.L.R. 220 at 222, Gill v. Harold
Andrews Sheepbridge Ltd., [1974] 1.R.L.R. 109 at 111; Hill v. Sabco Houseware
(U.K.) Ltd., [1977] I.R.L.R. 888 at 890; Pringle v. Lucas Industrial Equipment
Ltd., [1975] I.R.L.R. 266 (Liverpool Tribunal).
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have a pension plan, but on less favourable terms, the employee is
entitled to a capital sum to enable him to buy in the market the
benefits needed to bridge the gap. 93 It follows that the employee
should be entitled to the future contributions during the period of
unemployment following discharge 94 and during any requalification period under the rules of his new pension plan. 95 From
this capital sum is discounted an accelerated payment factor and an
amount representing the likelihood of the employee not remaining
on payroll until vesting or retirement. 96
The second method differs in that it estimates the pension benefit
97
which the employee would ultimately have got at retirement,
multiplies that amount by the number of years he is expected to live
after retirement 98 and discounts for ". . .accelerated payment, the
likelihood of remaining in employment 99 until retirement,' 00 . . . a
chance of obtaining similar benefit and at what stage a similar
benefit may first be obtained." 101 To that is added any possible loss
of tax allowance which the employee will have sustained.' 02 In
addition, if the plan provides that a spouse or a dependent can take
advantage under it, then the actual and/or future marital and
dependency status of the employee must be ascertained, for the
93. This was done in Willment Brothers Ltd. v. Oliver (1979), I.C.R. 378 at
385-386.
94. Contrast McKinney v. Bieganek, [1973] 1.R.L.R. 311 at 312, where the
N.I.R.C. refused to overturn a Tribunal award which had failed to compensate the
employee for a 12 month period of unemployment because such period was not, in
the view of the N.I.R.C., ". . .sufficiently large to justify any interference." It is
submitted that the decision should be regarded as incorrect on that point.
95. Hill v. Sabco Houseware (U.K.) Ltd., [1977] l.R.L.R. 888 (E.A.T.) at 891;
Page v. East Midlands Electricity Board, [1975] 1.R.L.R. 21 (Nottingham
Tribunal).
96. For example, damages were reduced by such a factor in Yeats v. Fairey
Winches Ltd., [1974] 1.R.L.R. 362. See also Copson v. Eversure Accessories
Ltd., [1974] 1.R.L.R. 247 at 250.
97. An excellent illustration is Powrmatic Ltd. v. Bull, [1977] I.R.L.R. 144
(E.A.T.). See also Tesco Stores Ltd. v. Heap, [1978] I.T.R. 17; and John Millar
andSons v. Quinn, [1974] I.T.R. 281.
98. In Powrnatic Ltd. v. Bull, ibid, the E.A.T. held that 4-5 years was
appropriate, rather than the 8 year multiplier utilized by the Industrial Tribunal.
99. Eg. PowrmaticLtd. v. Bull, ibid. at 146.
100. Thus in PowrmaticLtd. v. Bull, ibid. at 146, the E.A.T. held that it was
"improbable" that a sales manager with 33 years to go before retirement would
stay in the same job throughout that period. Rather, the E.A.T. projected that a 15
year stay was the appropriate multiplier.
101. Per Kilner Brown J., at 222, in Smith, Kline and French Laboratories v.
Coates, [1977] 1.R.L.R. 220.
102. Ibid.
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spouse/dependent may be able to benefit notwithstanding the death
of the employee himself. 10 3 The multiplier variables, therefore, are
essentially the same as with the first "contribution" method. The
British Government Actuary's Department recommends that this
method be used wherever circumstances permit. 10 4 However,
where it is "difficulty or unreasonable"' 1 5 to estimate the ultimate
pension benefit, such as with an employee who is a long way from
retirement or a pension based on company profitability, the
"contribution" method will be used. So too where the employee
would not be realistically compensated by the method. Thus in
Tesco Stores Ltd. v. Heap10 6 the industrial tribunal multiplied the
ultimate pension benefit of £1,500 per year by 41/2 years estimated
longevity for a total of;£6,750. The Employment Tribunal quashed
the award, being satisfied on the basis of actuarial evidence that the
employee could purchase an equivalent pension of £1,500 per year
for 41/2 years for the sum of £3,375 at the prevailing market rate,
(the employee being 47 years old at the time). The Employment
Appeal Tribunal considered the discrepancy too great for it to be
said that the employee was being truly compensated; rather, he was
receiving a windfall. Phillips J. cautioned against losing sight of the
fundamental compensatory goal in the swamp of actuarial
methodology.' 0 7 Again, it should be noted that the duty to mitigate
and the problem of proving pension losses, which are discussed
later,' 0 8 apply to both methods.
The most controversial issue in the assessment of both past and
future pension benefit losses is how to quantify numerically the
relevant variables. In one case, 10 9 for example, the Employment
Appeal Tribunal substituted a period of 3-5 years post retirement
103. As in Copson v. EversureAccessories Ltd., [1974] 1.R.L.R. 247 at 251.
104. Supra, note 72 at para 10(2).
105. Per Kilner Brown J. in Smith, Kline and French Laboratories v. Coates,
[1977] 1.R.L.R. 220 at 22 2.
106. [1978] I.T.R. 17(E.A.T.).
107. Ibid. at p. 22. Phillips J. stated that the Powrmatic approach is only
appropriate where an annual loss can first be ascertained and only then converted
into a capital loss respectively. In Scottish Co-op Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Lloyd,
[1973] I.C.R. 137 at 142, Sir John Donaldson said that evidence of a professional
actuary ". . .is not the only proper approach and in many cases it will be properly
regarded as not only inconclusive but also quite unnecessary. We think that insofar
as in this region it is possible that the broad common sense approach should be
adopted."
108. Infra, p. 370 and p. 371.
109. PowrmaticLtd. v. Bull, [1977] 1.R.L.R. 144 (E.A.T.).
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life expectancy for the industrial tribunal's estimate of 8 years.
Bristow J., without citing any supporting evidence, considered the
former to be "appropriate" 110 because the employee had not
established that he was an average, healthy male and, even if he
had, the trauma of retirement might kill him! In the same case,
Bristow J. held (quite reasonably) that the industrial tribunal had
erred in assuming that a sales manager would remain with the same
company for the 33 year balance of his working life but substituted a
15 year multiplier without any supporting reasons. 1 1' In today's era
of economic uncertainty, more so perhaps than at any other time, it
is exceedingly difficult to guess at likely interest returns on
employee capital sum and pension fund investments, general
inflation rates, corporate profitability (and even survivability), and
labour market conditions.
In order to alleviate some of those difficulties, the Government
Actuary's Department in 1981 published its Guide for industrial
tribunals in calculating pension benefit losses." 2 It contains a table
of factors and supporting formulae, based on "state of the art"
actuarial methodology. The Guide seems to have acquired
considerable weight, almost to the point of raising a presumption of
being an accurate compensating tool for all cases. In Tradewinds
Airways Ltd. v. Fletcher"13 an industrial tribunal was persuaded by
the testimony of an actuary to depart from the Guide
because the employee would be entitled to collect a pension at 55,
not at 65 as in the Guide. Indeed, the Guide itself contemplates
114
departures where the circumstances of particular cases so justify.
The Employment Appeal Tribunal, however, quashed the award on
the ground that it exceeded the Guide by £2,000 and that therefore
". .clearly there must be a mistake in law, even though we may
not be able to put our finger on it."15 Eventually the Employment
Appeal Tribunal "put its finger" on the fact that the tribunal had
ignored the possibility of the employee dying before reaching
pensionable age. Although Bristow J. described the status of the

110. Ibid., at 146.
111. Ibid. See also Tradewinds Airways Ltd. v. Fletcher, [1981] I.R.L.R. 272
(E.A.T.).
112. Supra, note 72.
113. [1981] 1.R.L.R. 272 (E.A.T.).
114. Supra, note 72 at para 2.
115. [1981] 1.R.L.R. 272 at 275 (E.A.T.).
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Guide as merely an "assistance," ' 116 it seems to carry more weight
than that in practice. The important point, however, is that such a
guide would be of considerable use to Canadian legal umpires so
long as it is remembered that the ultimate decision lies with the
umpire who is in the position to assess the uniqueness of each
employee's situation.
c) The Employee's Duty to MitigateHis PensionBenefit Losses
It is established that failure to discharge the duty to mitigate will
reduce compensation for losses of both future 17 and earned pension
benefits. 118 An example of the former would be if the employee had
acquired another job by the date of hearing at a wage level
sufficiently in excess of the old job to enable him to purchase
equivalent pension benefits of his own accord, but he chooses not to
do so and seeks to recover for future pension benefit losses from his
former employer. An example of the latter is Sweetlove v.
Redbridge and Waltham Forest Area Health Authority, 119 where
the employee refused his employer's offer of full reinstatement and
sought to recover, inter alia, the employer's past contributions. The
Employment Appeal Tribunal rejected the claim on the ground that
the employee had acted "wholly unreasonably" '12 0 in refusing
reinstatement and had therefore not discharged his duty to mitigate.
Slynne J. stated that the duty applied equally to accrued pension
benefits, for if the employee had accepted he would have been put
in the same position as if he had never been fired. In a sense, the
employee's losses were caused by his own act. The position would
presumably be the same were the employee not to request
reinstatement as a remedy from the tribunal, and a fortiori if he
refused the tribunal's offer of reinstatement. The foregoing assumes
that the refusal is "wholly unreasonable"' 2 - in the circumstances of
the case. It is established that the onus of proving that the employee
22
has acted "wholly unreasonable" is on the employer. '
116. Ibid. To similar effect see Toye v. Todd andDuncan Ltd., I.D.S. Brief 186,
August 1980, p. 3.
117. Smith, Kline and French Laboratories v. Coates, [1977] I.R.L.R. 220 at
222.
118. Sturdy Finance Ltd. v. Bardsley, [1979] I.R.L.R. 65 at 67; supra, note 74;
Sweetlove v. Redbridge and Waltham Forest Area Health Authority, [1979]
I.R.L.R. 195 (E.A.T.).
119. Ibid., note 118.
120. Ibid., note 118 at 196.
121. Ibid.
122. Sturdy FinanceLtd. v. Bardsley, [1979] 1.R.L.R. 65 at 67.
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The position is more doubtful where the employee has the option
under the plan and the legislation of either commuting for a cash
sum the whole or part of his pension benefit upon dismissal, or of
leaving it as a deferred pension until retirement (or, less commonly,
transferring it to a successive employer under portability provisions). There is one dictum implying that choice of the first option
would not discharge the duty to mitigate. 12 3 The better view,
however, is that it depends on the circumstances of the case whether
the first option is "wholly unreasonable."' 2 4 For example, it might
be very prudent to invest a commuted pension in government bonds
at a time when they are offering exceptionally attractive interest
returns in the region of 20% and when the projected pension return
at retirement will have been eroded by inflation to provide a less
valuable overall benefit. So too if the capital sum is used to establish
the employee in his own business, which may bring him more
favourable long term benefits than his expected pension return. It is
important to remember that not all employees will lavish their
commuted pension on extravagant holidays and drinking bouts.
Indeed, in the present climate of high, long term unemployment the
employee may be forced to use his pension in order to survive.
d) The Problem of ProvingPensionBenefit Losses
The British Government Actuary's Department Guide provides that
the employer/employee should furnish the tribunal with the
following information: 12 5 the age and sex of the employee; his
length of pensionable service; his salary at termination; the
employer's contribution rate; benefits received by the employee,
including premiums paid by the employer under the old age pension
legislation; accrued pension entitlement based on salary and service
at termination; and any spousal pension entitlement. The tribunal
itself is charged with assessing the estimated period of employment
and the possibilities of the employee entering nonpensionable, or
less favourable pensionable employment.126 Although the employer

123. Copson v. EversureAccessories Ltd., [1974] 1.R.L.R. 247 at 250.
124. See eg. the facts of Sturdy FinanceLtd. v. Bardsley, [1979] 1.R.L.R. 65 at
67, wherein the employer failed to adduce evidence to ascertain sufficiently
accurately that the present value of the withdrawn contributions would be less to the
employee than the value at retirement of the deferred pension.
125. Supra, note 72 at para 14.
126. Ibid.
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is in the best position to disclose most of the above information,127
it is the employee who carried the legal burden of proving his
pension losses, 1 9 8 which may be no easy matter given the
complexity of the inquiry. It must also be remembered that many
employees are not represented by legal counsel, as is also the case in
adjudication under the Canada Labour Code. In practice, the
industrial tribunals take the initiative of raising the question and
may even go so far as to make their own investigations, including
ordering that the employer disclose the relevant information,
especially where the employee is representing himself. 129 The legal
burden of proving a particular loss, however, remains on the
employee and in the absence of evidence in support thereof, no
award will be given. This more "inquisitorial" role of the tribunal
was adopted in the Willberg adjudication under the Canada Labour
Code. 130 It is obviously vital for the legal umpire to be flexible in
this regard.
V. Conclusion
The following guide is suggested for the compensation of pension
benefit losses in unlawful discharge cases. It can be used safely by
adjudicators under section 61.5 of the Canada Labour Code. It can
be used by collective agreement arbitrators who are prepared to
assume jurisdiction to compensate the "unjustly" discharged
employee without reinstating him. It can be used in a common law
wrongful dismissal action within the constraint of the contractual
notice period "cut-off" date, but only beyond that if the courts are
prepared to adopt the "independent contract"' 3 1 device.
127. Section 1l(l)(c) of the Dominion Pension Benefits Standards Act requires
that the plan provide for a "written explanation" to be given the employee,
describing the plan's prevailing terms and conditions and explaining his rights and
duties under the plan. Notwithstanding that section, it is probably safe to guess that
most employees would not know sufficiently well their pension position in order to
conduct an adequate case. Contrast the more detailed information required to be
given by paragraph 26 of the Ontario Pension Benefits Act Regulations.
128. This point was emphasized in Smith, Kline and French Laboratories v.
Coates, [1977] 1.R.L.R. 220 at 221. See also Cawthorn and Sinclair Ltd. v.
Hedger, [1974] I.C.R. 146 (N.I.R.C.); Hilti G.B. v. Windridge, [19741 I.R.L.R.
53, especially at 55 (N.I.R.C.).
129. See eg. Copson v. Eversure Accessories Ltd., [1974] 1.R.L.R. 247 at 250;
Smith, Kline and French Laboratories v. Coates, [1977] 1 .R.L.R. 220 at 222;
Tidman v. Aveling MarshallLtd., [ 1977] I.C.R. 506 (E.A.T.).
130. Supra, p. 361.
131. Supra, p. 347.
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Firstly, the legal umpire must ensure that he obtains the following
information from the employee or the employer: 132 the age and sex
of the worker; the length of pensionable service; his salary at the
date of discharge; the employee's contribution rate; any benefits
received by the employee; his accrued pension entitlement based on
salary and service at the date of discharge; and any spouse's or
dependant's entitlement based on salary and service at the date of
discharge. As was suggested earlier, the umpire should be prepared
to assume an "inquisitorial" role in order to guarantee that the requisite evidence is brought before him. 13 3 The umpire will also have
to make projections as to the employee's future career and pension
positions with his old and successive employers and as to the length
of unemployment, which will have to be ascertained from testimony
at the hearing and from the umpire's personal assessment of local
labour market conditions.
The employee's pension benefit loss is made up of three
components, each of which may be computed independently and
totalled to give the full amount.
A. Loss of accrued pension position as of the date of unlawful
discharge.
B. Loss of future pension position that would have been attained
between the date of discharge and the expiry of the notice
period required for lawful termination of the employment
contract.
C. Loss of future pension position after the expiry of the notice
period which would have been attained had the employee not
been unlawfully discharged.
A. Computing accruedpension benefit losses
(Pr. V. x [E.C. + W.C. + I]-

R.W.C.

Wherein:
1. Pr.V. = Probability of the employee remaining in the job until
vesting date. This can safely be taken as a scale moving from
zero at age 25 through to 100% at age 45, assuming that age 45 is
vesting date, and subject to any unique characteristics influencing
the labour market mobility of the employee.
2. W. C. = employee contributions to the fund paid in prior to the
date of discharge.
132. British Government Actuary's Department Guide para 14(a), supra, note 72.
133. At para 16, supra, note 72.
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3.

E.C. = employer contributions to the fund paid in prior to the
date of discharge. These will obviously be easy to ascertain in
"defined contribution" plans, but less easy in "defined
benefit" plans. The latter may take the form of "career
average" or "flat benefit" plans, wherein the amount of
expected benefit at any given time is already known. The
employee should receive a capital sum to enable him to
purchase the amount of his lost benefit. This can safely be
calculated by reference to the deferred pension benefit column
of the British Government Actuary's Department Guide (table
#1). Thus a male employee aged 45 would be entitled to $3.10
for each $1 of benefit payable at retirement, subject to reduction
for the absence of a widow's pension, as per note 1, if
applicable. Further adjustments to this amount are unnecessary
since the benefits have already been earned by the employee.
On the other hand, in "final earnings" and final average
earnings" plans, wherein benefits are based on the employee's
earnings in his last years before retirement and his best earning
years respectively, the computation is more difficult because of
the uncertainty of predicting such future earnings capacity. This
is especially so in the case of younger employees. It is
submitted that a reasonably safe method for use with employees
below 45 years of age is "notional contribution". This involves
dividing the total employer contributions to the plan over the
claimant's period of employment by the number of participants
in the plan so as to produce a "notional" employer contribution
for each participant. Although the method is not exact, it does
produce a reasonably fair estimation of the loss. In the case of
older workers who are closer to the key earnings years, it is
possible to predict future earnings capacity with sufficient
accuracy to produce a reasonable estimation of expected
benefits. Table #1 can then safely be used to compute the cost
of those benefits.

Compensation for Pension Benefit Losses 375

TABLE 1
TABLE OF FACTORS FOR VALUING PENSIONS
Value at age on dismissal of a pension of I per annum
Men with retiring age 65
Age last
birthday
on
dismissal

64
63
62
61
60
59
58
57
56
55
54
53
52
51
50
49
48
47
46
45
44
43
42
41
40
35-39
30-34
Under 30

Continuing
Service
(Accrued
pension)

Dismissal
(Deferred
pension)

1

2

10-3
10-0
9-7
9-5
9-3
9-1
8-9
8-7
8-6
8-4
8-3
8-1
8-0
7-8
7-7
7-6
7-5
7-4
7-3
7-1
7-0
6-9
6-8
6-7
6-6
6-3
6-0
5-5

10-1
9.4
8-8
8-2
7-7
7-2
6-8
6-4
6-0
5-7
5-4
5-1
4-8
4-5
4-3
4-0
3-8
3-6
3-4
3-2
3-1
2-9
2-7
2-6
2-4
2-1
1-7
1-2

Women with retiring age 60
Continuing
Service
(Accrued
pension)

Dismissal
(Accrued
pension)

12

11-6
11-4
11-2
10-9
10-7
10-5
10-3
10-1
9-9
9-7
9-5
9-4
9-2
9-0
8-9
8-7
8-6
8-4
8-3
8-1
7-8
7-1
6-5

11-4
10-7
10-0
9-4
8-8
8-3
7-8
7-3
6-8
6-4
6-0
5-7
5-4
5-1
4-8
4-5
4-2
3-9
3-7
3-5
3-1
2-3
1-7

Notes
1. The male factors in the table make allowance for a widow's pension equal to
one-half of the employee's pension. Where the scheme does not provide widow's
pensions, the factors ought to be reduced by approximately 25 per cent., with a pro
rata reduction (or increase) for other levels of widow's pension.
2. If the scheme provides a lump sum benefit on retirement in addition to a
pension, the amount of the pension should be increased by one-tenth of the lump
sum for men (one-twelfth of the lump sum for women) before applying the factors
from the table.
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3. Some pension schemes, mostly in the public sector, provide deferred pensions
on termination of service that are increased in line with changes in price levels. In
such cases the loss of pension rights on dismissal would be very much less than the
value given by the above table, although there would be some loss to the extent that
earnings increases may be expected to exceed price increases. An approximate
value for the loss of pension rights in these circumstances would be one-half of the
value obtained from the table.

4. I = interest at the prevailing market rate for R.R.S.P.'s up to
the date of judgment.
5. R.W.C. = contributions of the employee which have been
returned to him.
B. Losses during the notice period
([B.B. + I. + T.] X Pr.V. X Pr.J.L.)
-

A.P.F. -

S -M.

Wherein:
1. B.B. = the basic pension benefit, calculated the same as for the
accrued pension position at the date of discharge' 34 , except that
the date of expiry of the notice period is substituted for the date
of discharge.
2. I = interest on the employer's contributions throughout the
notice period at the prevailing rate for R.R.S.P.'s.
3. T = any taxation disadvantage the employee is likely to sustain
during the notice period by being deprived of his opportunity to
participate in the pension plan.
4. Pr.V. = the probability of the employee attaining vesting date
during the notice period. Although this ought theoretically to be
vital, it should be emphasized that in a common law wrongful
dismissal action the courts have compensated for employer
contributions during the notice period irrespective of the
probabilities of vesting, presumably under some theory of
unjust enrichment.
5. Pr.J.L. = the probability of the employee losing his job
lawfully during the notice period had he not been unlawfully
discharged. This will not normally arise since in most cases the
notice period will have elapsed by the time the action is heard.
134. Supra, p. 373.
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6. A.P.F. = accelerated payment factor. Compensation must be
reduced to take account of the interest the employee will earn by
investing his early pension benefit and can safely be taken as the
prevailing interest rate. Given the relatively short compensable
period, this factor will not be a major one.
7. S = the pension benefit which the employee derives from
successive employment during the notice period. This involves
examining whether successive plans are more or less beneficial
to the employee than his old one. Also, the successive job may
have no pension plan but carry commensurately higher wages
than the old one, which the employee can reasonably be
expected to spend on his own pension plan. Given that the
notice period will normally have expired by the date of the
hearing, it will be unnecessary in most cases to have to predict
the employee's chances of finding successive pensionable
employment.
8. M = non compliance with the general duty to mitigate losses.
C. Loss of future pension position that would have been attained
had the employee not been unlawfully discharged
([B.B. + T] x Pr.J.L. x Pr.V. x Pr.L.) -

S - A.P.F. - M.

Wherein:
1. B.B. = the basic pension benefit which the employee would be
entitled to had he remained in the job until retirement. This can
be calculated using the methodology for the employee's accrued
pension position outlined earlier, 135 but substituting retirement
date for the date of discharge.
2. T = any taxation disadvantage the employee is likely to sustain
by being deprived of his opportunity to participate in the
pension plan.
3. Pr.J.L. = the probability of the employee losing his job
lawfully during the remainder of his working life had he not
been discharged. This entails predicting the likelihood of the
employee resigning, dying, being made redundant, or being
6
discharged for cause. 13
135. Supra, p. 373.
136. The following table gives the probabilities of an employee remaining in the
same employment as a function of attained age and tenure for high, medium and
low mobility job sectors. It was provided by Towers, Perrin, Forster and Crosby
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4. Pr.V. = the probability of the employee remaining in the firm
37
until vesting date had he not been discharged.'
5. Pr.L. = the probable post retirement longevity of the
138
employee.
Ltd. For an example, an employee aged between 27 and 32 in a medium mobility
job sector who has 3 years seniority with the firm has an 84.6% probability of
remaining in his job for a further year.
The following graph gives the expected employment tenure for high, medium
and low mobility sectors as a function of job entry age and attained age. For
example, an employee who enters the work force at age 20, and who has an
attained age of 45 in a low mobility sector job will probably remain in that job for a
further 15.4 years.

30.0
Entry Age 20

25.0

25.
.~20.0

15.0
10.0
5.0
.0
20.

25.

30.

35.

45.

40.

50.

55.

60.

65.

age

137. Supra, note 136.
138. The following life expectancy table was calculated by the authors, based on
data supplied by London Life Insurance Company. It should be emphasized that the

Age
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Life Expectancy
(Female)
(Male)
22.91
17.91
22.16
17.16
21.43
16.43
20.72
15.72
20.02
15.02
19.35
14.35
13.69
18.69
13.04
18.04
17.41
12.41
11.80
16.80
16.19
11.19
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6. S = the pension benefits, or commensurately higher wage
adjustment which the employee has either received, or can
probably be expected in the future to receive from successive
employers. This factor is very difficult to determine because it
involves projections over the employee's entire working
lifetime as to his chances of getting successive jobs' 39 and the
comparative pension/wage positions between those jobs and his
old job had he remained in it.
7. A.P.F. = accelerated payment factor representing the interest
the employee will earn by investing his early pension benefit.
This entails predicting the general interest rates, 140 no easy
matter in today's volatile economic environment.

data is generalized, so that the legal umpire must take account of any peculiarities
pertaining to the individual claimant. It also assumes a rough difference of 5 years
increased longevity for females.
139. The following table gives the expected number of job changes and length of
employment for high, medium and low mobility sectors as a function of job entry
and retirement ages. Thus a person who enters the labour market at age 20 and will
retire at age 65 in a low mobility sector will probably have 3.1 jobs in his working
life, each of 14.7 years duration. The table was provided by Towers, Perrin,
Forster and Crosby Ltd.
Termination

Periods of employment

rates
Low
Medium
High

20-60
3.0
6.6
12.3

20-65
(13.5)
( 6.0)
( 3.3)

3.1
7.0
13.1

25-60
(14.7)
( 6.5)
( 3.4)

2.8
5.9
10.6

25-65
(12.7)
( 6.0)
( 3.3)

2.9
6.2
11.4

(14.0)
( 6.4)
( 3.5)

140. The following table, provided by Towers, Perrin, Forster and Crosby Ltd.,
gives predictions regarding the rates of inflation, return on investment, and wage
growth which provide a useful guideline.

1980-84
1985-89
1990-

Rate of Inflation
Most
Low
probable
High

Total rate Of retuM
Most
Low
Probable
High

4.5
4.0
3.0

6.9
6.6
5.4

5.5
5.0
4.0

7.5
7.0
6.0

7.9
7.6
6.4

9.9
9.6
8.4

Real
wage
growth
1.8
2.0
2.1
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8. M = non compliance with the general duty to mitigate losses.
If the reader concludes that the computation of compensation for
lost pension benefits is a rather inexact exercise, he would be
absolutely correct. However, it is hoped that the foregoing
guidelines will be of some use in producing fair and reasonable
estimations, which is, in the authors' view, all that can realistically
be hoped for.

